This paper considers an optimal contracting problem between an informed risk-averse agent and a principal, when the agent needs to perform multiple tasks, and the principal is active, i.e. she can influence some aspect of the agency relationship. It discusses the optimality of action restrictions in the equilibrium menus of linear contracts showing that private information considerations add new trade-offs to the optimal contracts in the multitask setting. The paper also has novel implications for the capital budgeting literature that studies informational problems. In particular the nature of the private information, e.g.
Introduction
Managerial compensation and the allocation of productive tasks to agents is an important aspect of many business enterprises. The principal-agent literature has successfully dealt with many aspects of the problem: from perk consumption (Jensen and Meckling (1976) ) to moral hazard (Holmstrom (1979) ) and adverse selection (Laffont and Tirole (1986) ), economists have developed many insights into the properties of optimal contractual arrangements in agency settings. The novel aspect of this paper is to analyze a more general version of the standard principal agent framework which allows the principal to take an active role in the agency relationship, in addition to writing contracts. Examples of the types of actions the principal may take include: transfer-pricing decisions among divisions (Besanko and Sibley (1991) ), a capital allocation rule (Bernardo, Cai, and Luo (2001) ), control of the set of projects the agent has access to (Sung (1995) , Hirshleifer and Suh (1992) ), task assignment decisions (Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991) ), setting part of the firm's strategy (Dow and Raposo (2002) ), design of the compensation measure (Feltham and Xie (1994) ), auditing and capital allocation (Harris and Raviv (1996) ), and/or a productive effort choice that complements the actions of the agent.
The model is framed in the CARA preferences with Gaussian risk and linear contracts setting introduced in Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987) and further developed to the multi-task case in Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991) . On top of the standard moral hazard problem I study the situation where the agent possesses some private information, which can be interpreted to be either about his ability or about the profitability of the division he controls. The principal can influence the agent's decisions by the compensation package she offers to the agent, and by other actions she may take that indirectly impact the agency relationship. A crucial aspect of the model is the active role played by the principal besides setting wages. In particular, I allow the principal to offer the agents a menu of wage-action combinations from which they can choose (where the action can be any of the aspects of the agency relationship mentioned above).
The paper first studies a general agency setting in which the set of wage-action combinations that are implementable are characterized. Furthermore, the principal's problem is reduced to one of maximizing a simple distorted surplus function, which accounts for the costs imposed by the existence of private information. The paper takes the standard mechanism design paradigm (e.g. Fudenberg and Tirole (1991) ) and generalizes its main theorems to deal with the case where there is an agency relationship and the mechanism is multi-dimensional. 1 Both the set of implementability conditions and the characterization of the optimal mechanisms follow standard derivations in the literature, although the conclusions already have some novel features: in particular the set of implementable mechanisms is enlarged significantly once the principal can screen agents through both the contracts offered and the additional actions that impact the agency relationship.
These results are then applied to two different models in sections 4 and 5: one in which both the agent and the principal take a one-dimensional action, and one in which the agent's effort choice is multi-dimensional. The first model, presented in section 4, will be interpreted as an agency relationship in which the agent exerts effort to increase expected output, whereas the principal offers each of the agents a capital budget (similar interpretations can be found in Bernardo, Cai, and Luo (2001) and Sung (2001) ). The point of departure from the literature is to consider a more general agency setting, since the models studied in the literature are quite specialized. The main result is to show that the nature of the private information, e.g.
whether it affects the marginal value of investment, the value of the agent's effort choice, or potential interactions between effort and investment, may change standard features of the optimal contracts. The analysis in this section shows that adverse selection models can generate much richer implications than those established in the literature. The paper solves analytically for a set of special cases, showing that many of the standard features of the optimal contracts may be reversed. Moreover, it gives conditions under which different comparative statics will prevail, thereby generating a rich set of empirical implications.
The multi-task feature of most real-world incentive problems has sprung substantial recent interest (Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991) ). The second model, discussed in section 5, adds to this literature by analyzing the effects of private information in the task assignment decision.
The only action the principal takes is the decision of the set of tasks that each agent can perform. Action restrictions are shown to be optimal in a third-best world in a (weak) generic sense, even for cases in which the second-best solution does not involve any restrictions on the agent's action set. Therefore private information considerations bring new trade-offs to the optimality of such action restrictions, thereby complementing the generic optimality shown in Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991) . Moreover, the distortion in the optimal contingent compensation from the second-best to the third-best solution 2 is not necessarily downwards, as in the case where the principal is inactive.
The analysis in this paper follows the tradition in the capital budgeting literature started with Harris, Kriebel, and Raviv (1982) and Antle and Eppen (1985) . The model in section 4 is formally very close to those in Bernardo, Cai, and Luo (2001) and Sung (2001) , who also jointly modeled the capital budgeting and compensation scheme under private information.
As in these two papers, the model here will generalize the early capital budgeting literature by allowing the principal a larger action scope in the agency relationship. It should be noted that the results mentioned above are obtained by simply considering more general versions than those presented in the papers by Bernardo, Cai, and Luo (2001) and Sung (2001) . 3 The analysis of the task allocation decisions is very closely related to that of Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991) , who ignored in their analysis private information considerations. Other recent papers that study the potential optimality of action restrictions are Szalay (2002) and Carrillo (2002) . Szalay (2002) looks at the optimality of (ex-post) task allocation decisions from the point of view of motivating effort decisions ex-ante. Carrillo (2002) studies a model driven by career concerns of the managers, and the task assignment decisions play the role of screening devices. In contrast, this paper's driving forces are the trade-off between production inefficiencies and informational rents considerations. 4
Section 2 presents the model and solves for the optimal contracts and actions in the case with symmetric information. Section 3 characterizes the set of implementable mechanisms and reduces the principal's problem to a simple pointwise maximization. The main results are contained in sections 4 and 5, where the previous results are specialized to the two settings described above. All proofs are relegated to the appendix.
The model and benchmark solutions
In this section I describe the model and relate it to those in the literature. The solutions when there is not adverse selection nor moral hazard (first-best world) and when there is not adverse selection (second-best world) are then discussed.
3 A similar comment applies to the analysis of transfer-pricing in Besanko and Sibley (1991) , who study a (formally) very similar model to the one to be presented in this paper, albeit with a different motivation. 4 Dybvig, Carpenter, and Farnsworth (2000) also allow the principal to control part of the agency relationship, in their case the agent's trading strategy, in a similar fashion to the active principal in this paper.
4

Elements of the model
Consider an agency relationship where there is a contractible signal given by
where ∼ N (0, 1), e ∈ E ⊂ R n is an action taken by the agent, and a ∈ A ⊂ R m is an action taken by a principal. For simplicity I assume that there is a continuum of agents with total mass normalized to one. The variable θ indexes the agents and is also used to measure the private information possessed by the agent. It is assumed that θ ∈ [θ,θ] ≡ Θ, and that the principal knows that in the population θ is distributed according to the distribution function F (θ) with associated density f (θ). The inverse of the hazard rate
assumed to be bounded and monotonic.
Output is driven by both the agent's and principal's actions, and is also dependent on the private information of the agent. I assume that the principal is risk-neutral. She accrues benefits B(e, a, θ) from the interaction with the agent and their productive actions. The action a has a personal cost for the principal of c P (a).
The principal and the agent can only use linear functions of Y as contracts, which I will denote by w ≡ α + βY . 5 The agent has CARA preferences and incurs a separable cost given by c(e, θ). Define C(e, a, θ) ≡ c(e, θ) + c P (a). His certainty equivalent utility can be expressed as
The principal's utility can be expressed as
The following assumptions 6 will be referred to as "standard assumptions:"
• The variable θ orders the types unambiguously by their efficiency. In particular I assume 5 This restriction to linear contracts has been shown to be without loss of generality in a dynamic version of this model in Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987) in the pure moral hazard case. Sung (2001) shows that introducing private information does not destroy the optimality of linear contracts in this type of continuous-time setting (see also Schattler and Sung (1993) ). It is worth noticing that if the agent were risk-neutral the restriction to linear contracts would be without loss of generality by standard arguments (see Laffont and Tirole (1986) ).
6 I use the notation fx(·) to denote the derivative of the function f with respect to x. For functions of one single real variable I will also use the notation f (x). For notational simplicity I omit the arguments of the functions when there is no room for ambiguity. C θ < 0 and C θe ≤ 0, 7 i.e. higher values of θ are associated with lower cost and lower marginal cost for the agent's effort choice.
• The function µ(·) is assumed to satisfy µ θ ≥ 0, i.e. higher values of θ are associated with higher values of the signal. Moreover, µ θe ≥ 0, i.e. agents with higher values of θ have a higher marginal value of effort.
• The marginal value of the principal's action is increasing in θ, i.e. µ θa ≥ 0.
These assumptions are standard in the literature. Note that these assumptions are neither more restrictive nor much more general than those made in previous papers: they are the standard Spence-Mirrlees single-crossing property when the signal and cost functions are modeled (separately) to be dependent on θ. These assumptions guarantee that in the standard model where there is a single action and a passive principal the optimal contract will be monotone in the private information possessed by the agent. Section 6 discusses how generalizations of these assumptions could be addressed. For now it is just worth noticing that since the main results of the paper are statements regarding weak generic properties of the model, 8 these "standard assumptions" are not necessary for the results.
By the revelation principle (e.g. Myerson (1979) ) the principal can restrict attention to a direct mechanism of the form {α(θ), β(θ), a(θ)}, where α is the fixed wage offered, β the bonus coefficient, and a the action that the principal controls. The optimal menu of contracts solves max {α,β,a}
such that
The constraint (5) is the standard individual rationality constraint. It is assumed that the reservation utility of the agent isū, independent of the agent's type. Constraint (6) is the truth-telling constraint, which states that the agent is better off announcing his true signal and receiving the allocation {α(θ), β(θ), a(θ)} than announcing a different typeθ when his true type is θ. Lastly, equation (7) requires the effort choice for the agent to maximize his expected 7 Note that C eθ is a vector, so C eθ < 0 means that The Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987) setting is obtained when θ has a degenerate distribution (i.e. there is no private information), n = 1 and A = ∅. For n arbitrary and A = {I i } n i=1 , with I i denoting the indicator variable taking on the value 1 if task i is assigned to the agent, a special case of the model discussed in Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991) is recovered. 9 Special cases of n = m = 1 are discussed in Besanko and Sibley (1991) , Sung (2001) , and Bernardo, Cai, and Luo (2001) , who consider settings where on top of the standard contractual agreement the principal is active, i.e. takes an action that affects some of the parameters in the agency model (transfer pricing policy in Besanko and Sibley (1991) and capital allocation in Sung (2001), and Bernardo, Cai, and Luo (2001)). The two novelties with respect to this literature are the simultaneous consideration of multi-task agency problems with private information when the principal can also influence the agency relationship in a fairly general agency setting.
The model just described is quite general. Nevertheless, some simplifying assumptions have been made, mostly for clarity in the exposition: σ 2 is assumed to be independent of e, a and θ; c(·) and c P (·) only depend on the respective effort levels of the agent and the principal, and the private information of the agent affects only the mean value of output and the cost function of the agent. Section 6 discusses the effects of these assumptions on the paper's results.
First-best and second-best benchmarks
In a first best world, where both e and θ were observable, the principal's problem is reduced to the maximization of (4) such that (5) is satisfied. The contract would stipulate paying the agent a fixed wage, since imposing risk on the agent is suboptimal. The optimal actions would be given by
When effort e is unobservable, but θ is common knowledge, the principal maximizes (4) such that (5) is satisfied, and the agent's action solves (7). This reduces to the model studied by Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991) , who showed the first-order approach is valid in this context (see also Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987) and Schattler and Sung (1993) ). Using (7) the optimal action for the agent is given by βµ e (e, a, θ) = c e (e, θ).
This first-order condition defines the function e(β, a, θ), which maps an arbitrary menu/signal pair to the effort chosen by the agent. I will also use the notation e(θ,θ) introduced in (7) as referring to e(a(θ), β(θ), θ). Using (8) one can eliminate the effort choice from the principal's problem and maximize over β the second-best surplus
to find the optimal contract. The above equation captures the standard features of the classic moral hazard problem: now the principal discounts the value of the actions e and a by the risk they impose on the risk-averse agent.
The following example presents a simple setting that will illustrate the main trade-offs with respect to action restrictions in a second-best world.
Example 1. Consider the linear-quadratic case given by B(·) = e b, µ(e) = e µ and c(e) = e Ce, where b, µ ∈ R n are some fixed vectors, e ∈ R n is the effort choice of the agent, and C ∈ R n×n is a symmetric matrix, as in Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991) . Let I be the diagonal matrix with a typical element the indicator variable I i as defined before. It is straightforward to show that the optimal effort is given by e = βC
denotes the inverse of the relevant cost matrix with the task assignment I. 10 Using this expression to eliminate e from the principal's objective function and maximizing over β we get that the optimal contract is given by
The optimal task allocation solves
From the above equation it is easy to give conditions under which it will be optimal to restrict a set of actions. For example, if n = 2 and C is the identity matrix, then I 1 = 0 is optimal as long as
Note that for R = 0 the second-best solution coincides with the first-best if n = 1, but
10 LetĈI be the submatrix of C composed of the rows and columns of C such that Ii = 1. Then C −1 I has 0's for all elements j, k such that Ij = 0 or I k = 0, and the submatrix for which Ij = I k = 1 is given byĈ
this is not the case in general. 11 To see this just note that as b 2 ↑ ∞ the above condition is automatically satisfied, i.e. it is optimal to restrict access to action 1. The intuition is that as the value of action 2 grows, it becomes optimal to avoid having the agent divert attention from action 2 to action 1. 12 Finally note that if b i = µ i , i.e. when the signal is just a noisy version of output, it will never be optimal to restrict the agent from any task. 13
Implementability and optimal contracts
In this section the main results needed to characterize the optimal mechanism are discussed.
The method of solution to the problem is standard: I use the first-order approach 14 to express the optimal effort level as a function of the contract, thereby reducing the problem to one in which there is no agency relationship and the principal has to design a mechanism to induce a particular allocation rule. It turns out that under the assumptions of CARA preferences, linear contracts and Gaussian returns the setting reduces to one with quasi-linear preferences. The model is thus reduced to a multi-dimensional allocation rules mechanism design problem with a one-dimensional information variable. 15 This section extends the results in the literature to the agency model introduced above.
The existence of private information conditions the set of allocations, combinations of contracts and actions, that the principal can achieve. A mechanism {α(θ), β(θ), a(θ)} is said to be implementable if it satisfies (6). The next proposition gives a necessary and sufficient condition for implementability in this model. Proposition 1. The following two conditions are sufficient for a differentiable mechanism {α(θ), β(θ), a(θ)} to be implementable:
11 This seems to be a novel observation: typically moral hazard models exhibit the property that efficiency is not affected if there are no risk-sharing considerations. For µ = b the optimal contract has β = 1, i.e. the agent becomes the residual claimant.
12 Note that e2 = (b1µ1 + b2µ2)µ2/(µ
2 ) in a second-best world with both tasks assigned and e2 = b2 when one task 2 is allowed.
13 This particular result does depend on the assumption that C is equal to the identity matrix. As shown in Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991) it is possible to have optimal action restrictions in this setting if the crosspartials in the cost function are non-zero.
14 It is worth noticing that under the restriction to linear contracts, which as mentioned before, is without loss of generality in the settings studied in this paper, the first-order approach to moral-hazard problems is always valid, i.e. the second-order conditions are immediately satisfied.
15 For a survey of the growing multi-dimensional mechanism design literature see Rochet and Stole (2000) . García (2001) gives the set of necessary and sufficient conditions for implementability in the type of model considered here in the case without an agency relationship.
where e(β, a, θ) is defined by (8). Equation (12) and (13) holding forθ = θ constitute a necessary condition for implementability.
The proof of the previous proposition starts by solving for the effort choice as a function of the mechanism, and thereby eliminate the agency relationship from the problem. By inspection it becomes clear that u is quasi-linear, and therefore we can apply standard techniques to characterize the implementability of the mechanisms (Fudenberg and Tirole (1991) ). Equation (12) is the first-order condition to the agent's information revelation problem. Condition (13) is equivalent to the second-order condition to this problem, which explains why we need the condition holding for all θ,θ ∈ Θ.
Proposition 1 gives a precise statement about the set of mechanisms that the principal can achieve. Condition (12) will be used in the next section to calculate the informational rents the agent gets under any feasible mechanism. Condition (13) puts a further constraint on the mechanisms that the principal can use: this is what the literature usually refers to as the "monotonicity constraint." In standard models this constraint yields the property that β and e must be increasing in the agent's announced type. As it will become clear in the next examples, equation (13) imposes a restriction in the sign of the derivative of the elements of the allocation rule (β and a), but this constraint is not as strict as in standard models.
Once the principal's action has a non-trivial effect on output the set of mechanisms that are implementable grows substantially: for example note that it could even be feasible to have a decreasing β(θ) function, since (13) does not rule it out.
The above characterization of the set of feasible mechanisms will be sufficient for the capital budgeting application of section 4, but the restriction to differentiable mechanisms is with loss of generality. In the general case, which is necessary to consider in the analysis of section 5, the above conditions should be substituted for statements holding for almost all θ ∈ Θ, i.e. at all those points where the mechanism is differentiable. The reader interested in the technical details is referred to Rochet (1985) and Stole (1997) . 16 The following examples consider some special cases to gain some further intuition into the restrictions that private information imposes on the set of contract/action pairs the principal can implement.
Example 2. Consider the case where µ is independent of θ, i.e. when private information only affects the costly effort function of the agent (his efficiency or ability). If e ∈ R, then (13) for any function β. On the other hand, when e(a, β, θ) is independent of a, implementability does imply that β must be a monotone function of θ.
It is interesting to note that in the general case where e ∈ R n for n ≥ 2 the implementability constraint does not require each element of the vector e to be increasing inθ, but rather
where
Finally note that it is true that de i /dθ ≥ 0 for all i is sufficient for implementability, although by the previous argument it is not necessary, i.e. restricting attention to models where the parameters are such that de i /dθ ≥ 0 for all i is not without loss of generality. 18
Example 3. Consider the case where C is independent of θ and µ θe = 0. This corresponds to the case where the agent's marginal value of effort is not affected by the private information that he possesses. Equation (13) becomes
If a ∈ R the above reduces to w 1 (·)β (θ) + w 2 (·)a (θ) ≥ 0 for appropriate functions w i (·).
When the principal's marginal value of her action is independent of the agent's private information, µ θa = 0, the equation reduces to the restriction dβ dθ ≥ 0 (since µ θ ≥ 0), i.e. the optimal bonus coefficient must be monotonically increasing. But note that this is the only restriction that yields a one-to-one connection between implementability and monotonicity of β: in the general case if µ θa > 0 is sufficiently large and da/dθ > 0 implementability is again guaranteed for any function β.
With the implementability issue resolved, I turn now to characterizing the optimal mechanism. The next proposition reduces the principal's problem to a simple pointwise maximization.
Proposition 2. The principal's problem reduces to the maximization of
and e = e(β, a, θ) is given by (8), such that the constraint (13) holds.
The principal's problem boils down to the maximization of the "virtual surplus" function
). The last term in (14) measures the cost for the principal due to the informational rents earned by the agent: all distortions from the second-best solution are generated by this term. Although the problem has been simplified significantly, the constraint (13) is still potentially binding. One could further develop the model explicitly taking into account this constraint (e.g. using the ironing procedure of Mussa and Rosen (1978) ). The standard approach in the literature is to ignore this constraint, and then check that it is not violated. Since the main results to be discussed in later sections are statements of (weak) generic existence of certain properties, I do not gain in generality by ignoring the cases where (13) could bind. 19 One could find conditions for the two applications presented in the next section under which we could safely ignore this constraint. Along these lines it is important to note that in all examples to be discussed later in the paper these second-order conditions are verified to hold at the optimal solutions.
Optimal capital budgeting schemes
In this section I consider a variation of the models in Bernardo, Cai, and Luo (2001) and Sung (2001) , which are characterized by the one-dimensional nature of the agent's and principal's action, i.e. the case where e ∈ R and a ∈ R. To keep the discussion concrete, and for comparison with the two mentioned papers, I will refer to the action a as the capital budget, or investment decision, set by the principal for the agent's division. In this spirit I will use I to denote the 19 If anything analyzing a smaller set of the potential models makes the genericity statements harder to obtain.
principal's action. It should be noted that very similar results could be generated interpreting a as an effort input by the principal that contributes to the profitability of the project.
Assume that the output function takes on a simple linear-quadratic form B(e, I, θ) = γ(θ)e + δ(θ)I + η(θ)eI;
and that this output is contractible (i.e. µ = B in the previous notation). Further assume that the cost of investment is given by c(I) = 1 2 I 2 . Moreover, assume that the private information does not affect the costly effort of the agent, i.e. c(e, θ) = c(e) (although this could be easily generalized as discussed before). Lastly, I will assume that c(e) = 1 2 e 2 .
In order to compare directly the results with those in Bernardo, Cai, and Luo (2001) I will set R = 0, so the optimal contracts in a second-best world are given by 20
The specification in (15), albeit stylized, captures other potentially important aspects of the agency relationship not considered in Bernardo, Cai, and Luo (2001) , which has γ(θ) = 0, δ(θ) = δ 0 + δ θ θ, and η(θ) = η 0 . In their work the agent is privately informed about the marginal value of the investment decision, independently of the effort choice. The importance of this element of the private information is measured by δ θ . Equation (15) allows for the private information of the agent to impact its own marginal productivity of effort, through γ (θ), and the interaction of the marginal value of investment that depends on the effort choice, measured by η (θ). As it will become clear in the following discussion, the nature of the private information of the agent has important implications for the design of the optimal contracts: it is very different to be informed about the pure marginal value of investment than about the pure marginal value of effort or about the interaction of the marginal values of effort and investment.
The next proposition characterizes the optimal mechanism in the general case, and solves for the optimal investment functions and contingent compensation explicitly in some special cases.
Proposition 3. The optimal mechanism when the non-negativity constraints do not bind, is characterized by
where Q(I) = (γ + ηI); L(I) = γ + η I; U (I) = 2η 2 I + 2ηγ − Hδ ;
A sufficient condition for the optimality of the above solutions is that η is sufficiently small, and δ is small relative to γ and/or γ .
(i) In the case where γ(θ) = 0, i.e. private information does not affect the value of the effort put forth by the agent, the optimal investment is given by
(ii) When η(θ) = 0, i.e. there is no interaction in the value function between investment and effort, the optimal investment function is given by
where q(θ) =
The optimal bonus coefficients β(θ) are given by (16).
It is worth noticing that in the general case it does not seem possible to obtain analytical solutions, since equation (17) is a high-order polynomial in I. Moreover, the sufficient conditions given in the proposition are far from necessary: the interested reader is urged to consult the proof of the proposition to see the precise necessary conditions for optimality. decisions. In particular, in the case where there are no synergies between the effort and investment the model yields a much richer set of results: it is possible for the non-negativity constraint on the investment decision to bind before the constraint on compensation, so that the agent gets some non-trivial compensation even though he does not receive any capital from the principal; and the functions I(θ) and β(θ) may be non-monotonic. In the case where private information only affects the pure marginal value of investment and when there are no interactions between investment and effort (the η(θ) = 0 and γ (θ) = 0 case) simple calculations show that the breakpoints for θ at which these non-negativity constraints bind are given by δ H = δ for θ I and δ H = γ 2 /δ for θ β . Therefore the relative size of the curves δ and γ 2 /δ determine whether θ I ≥ θ β . It should nevertheless be noted that several of the results in Bernardo, Cai, and Luo (2001) do hold for more general parameter values than those considered originally, as Table 1 The following examples describe some special cases in further detail.
Example 4. The case with γ(θ) = 0 and η (θ) = 0 was the one considered in Bernardo, Cai, and Luo (2001) , which yields as the optimal solutions
.
It is worth remarking that in this solution both I and β are increasing functions of θ. Moreover, if one accounts for the non-negativity constraint on I and β, it is straightforward to check that the values of θ for which these constraints bind are given by: δ H = δ for I and δ H = η 2 δ.
Since η 2 < 1 (from the second-order conditions), it is immediate that the non-negativity constraint binds first for β: there is a set of values of θ for which the principal invests in the agent's division without offering any contingent compensation.
21 Note that allowing for non-linearities would condition only the statements with regards to I (θ) and β (θ). 22 Although not explicitly reported in the main body these comments also apply to the results in Sung (2001) .
Example 5. Another simple case occurs when γ(θ) = 0 and δ = 0, i.e. asymmetric information only affects the interaction term of the investment decision with the agent's effort choice. It is easy to check that the above expression becomes:
where p(θ) = η 3 (η+4Hη ) (η+2Hη ) 2 . It is straightforward to check that β (θ) ≥ 0, but that there exists parameter values such that I (θ) < 0 for some θ.
Optimal task allocation decisions
In this section I analyze an alternative set of actions for an active principal: the restriction of the tasks to be performed by the agent. Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991) were the first to point out that in a standard moral hazard model it could be optimal to restrict the number of tasks that an agent performs. This section further studies how private information affects their findings.
I will use the following version of the Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991) model. I assume that final output is given by
and the signal is of the form µ(e, a, θ) = e (µ 0 + µ θ θ).
In a slight abuse of notation let µ(θ) ≡ µ 0 + µ θ θ and b(θ) ≡ b 0 + b θ θ. The effort e is costly for the agent, who incurs a loss in certainty equivalent terms of c(e) = 1 2 e C(θ)e, for a symmetric matrix C(θ) = C 0 + C θ θ.
Both output and the tasks to be performed by the agent are contractible. Therefore a mechanism now consists of a contract, characterized by a fixed wage α and a bonus coefficient β, as well as a set of actions to be performed. Define I i to be the indicator variable of whether task i is assigned to the agent or not. Then a mechanism is given by {α(θ), β(θ), I 1 (θ), . . . , I n (θ)}.
Define I to be the (n × n) diagonal matrix with elements I i (θ). I will assume that there is no associated cost with the actions (task assignment) taken by the principal in this case, although this could be easily generalized. Moreover, I assume that the tasks are not exclusive, i.e. an agent can be assigned an arbitrary number of tasks.
The following proposition specializes the previous results to this setting. Proposition 4. At an interior solution, the optimal contract is characterized by
where (I, θ) = (C I (θ)) −1 µ(θ), and m(I, θ) = C θ (I, θ).
The optimal task assignments I i (θ) are given by the solution to
Action restrictions, i.e. setting I i (θ) = 0 for some i and some θ, are optimal for an open set of parameter values.
The general trade-offs present in the expressions in the proposition are familiar: on one hand we have the agency costs due to the multi-dimensional moral hazard problem, now exacerbated by the existence of private information. Comparing the optimal contingent compensation given in equation (20) to the second-best solution (see equation (10)), it is immediate that holding the set of tasks constant in both problems private information lowers the bonus coefficient of the optimal contract. This is the standard result in previous agency models. But note that this statement depends crucially on the fact that the task assignments are the same in both the second-and third-best worlds. The objective function for the optimal allocation of tasks given by (21) is to be contrasted to that in a second-best world (11). The term involving the usual measure of informational costs H(θ) makes the optimal task assignments be potentially different, and thereby the contingent compensation may be higher in a second-best world than in a third-best world.
The following corollary gives the precise conditions under which an action will optimally be restricted for the case n = 2 in order to gain some further intuition.
Corollary 1. The optimal mechanism for n = 2 satisfies I 1 (θ) = 0 if and only if there exists θ for which The above condition is met in a (weakly) generic sense even when in a second-best world it is not optimal to restrict action 1.
The above corollary gave the precise conditions under which action restrictions become optimal in the presence of privately informed agents. I now present some comparative static results that follow from equation (22).
Corollary 2.
1. Restricting the agent to perform only task 2 is optimal if µ θ 1 and H are sufficiently large or if b 1 is sufficiently small.
2.
For large values of the risk-aversion of the agent R or of the noise in the performance measure σ 2 it becomes optimal to assign all tasks to all agents (I i (θ) = 1 for all θ ∈ Θ).
3. The fixed wage, contingent compensation, and effort levels on a particular task may be lower or higher in the presence of private information with respect to the case with asymmetric information.
The first statement captures the intuition that as the informational costs associated with action 1, measured by µ θ 1 , and the importance of informational rents considerations, measured by H, become large it will be optimal to restrict access to this action, in order to reduce the rents that agents earn under the optimal mechanism. Similarly, small values of b 1 involve a small opportunity cost for the principal from restricting access to action 1, which yields the optimality of this action restriction.
The intuition for the comparative static results with respect to R and σ 2 is a bit more subtle. For large values of this parameters the contingent compensation becomes small, since the agent is risk-averse. Now, as can be grasped from equation (27), the informational rents considerations are of order o(β 2 ), whereas the benefits from production are o(β). Therefore, as β ↓ 0, it becomes optimal to allow all agents to perform all tasks. Note that this result yields itself to simple empirical tests, since it predicts that in environments with high uncertainty (σ 2 ) we should see agents have more freedom in terms of the tasks assigned by the principal.
The last statement points out a significant difference between the standard model, in which private information always brings underproduction (lower levels of effort and contingent compensation in our setting), and the model discussed in this section where the principal also controls the task assigned to the agents. The intuition of the standard model nevertheless applies, albeit with a caveat: now underproduction does not imply that the agent will receive a lower contingent compensation contract. Underproduction is reflected in the potential optimality of action restrictions. When these occur, the phenomena described above can arise: with less tasks under the agent's command it may be optimal for the principal to give him a more aggressive contract (see Example 7). Note that even though the standard intuition applies, from an empirical perspective the standard comparative statics do not hold: the compensation is (highly) non-monotone with respect to private information. To the extent that task allocation decisions are hard to measure, this result shows that it would be possible to have more general relationships in the data between compensation and quality driven by private information considerations than previously considered.
I conclude this section with some illustrative examples.
Example 6. Consider the case with C θ = 0, so private information only affects the signal and output. Further assume that C is the identity matrix and that output is measurable (i.e. µ = b). Recall from section 2.2 that under these assumptions it is never optimal to restrict the actions. It is straightforward to check that condition (22) When informational rents are important, for large values of H(θ), and for values of the parameters and θ such that µ 1 ≈ µ 2 , the condition reduces to µ θ 1 ≥ 3µ θ 2 , i.e. the informational sensitivity of action 1 must be at least three times that of action 2 in order for action restrictions to be optimal when both actions are approximately equally important in terms of output. 
It is straightforward to solve the model for the second best case and note that action restrictions are not optimal for the above parameter values for all θ ∈ Θ. Figure 1 plots the optimal contracts and the principal's objective function in the case where the principal allows the agent to perform two tasks (solid line), when the agent is assigned only task 1 (dotted line), and when the agent is assigned only task 2 (dashed line). As is immediate from the figure,
for sufficiently low realizations of the signal it is optimal to restrict the agent to one single action (task one). Note that this in turn implies that there is a discontinuity in the contingent compensation function β(θ), as shown in Figure 1 . Furthermore, note how the presence of this action restriction distorts the solution significantly, even to the point of making the bonus coefficient in a third-best world higher than in a second best world (see Figure 1) . Figure 2 presents the optimal contracts for another set of parameter values, including in the graphs the second-best solutions. Note that the same features of the previous graph prevail in terms of the optimality of restricting action 1. More interestingly, note how the compensation function is dramatically non-monotone, as well as higher than in the contracting environment without private information, two features that never arise in standard models. Even more surprisingly, the compensation function in a third-best world is lower than in a second-best world for a range [θ, θ 1 ], higher for [θ 1 , θ 2 ], and lower again for [θ 2 ,θ]. This is driven by the action restrictions: in the case of private information these start in θ 2 , whereas in the pure moral hazard case action restrictions are only optimal for agents with θ ≤ θ 1 .
Extensions
Two technical aspects of the model studied in the paper deserve comment. Limited liability constraints, in particular setting α(θ) ≥ 0, are potentially binding for θ in its upper range, since the wage function is generically decreasing in its arguments. 23 This aspect of the optimal contracts, ignored throughout the paper, could be accounted for using standard techniques (see Thomas (2002) ) at the cost of analytical tractability. There would be further distortions away from the first-and second-best solutions, but none of the main qualitative aspects of the optimal contracts would be altered (see also the discussion in Bernardo, Cai, and Luo (2001) ).
The single-crossing properties for both the output and cost functions could be generalized without changing any of the results, as long as the agent's effective preferences did satisfy the single-crossing property (thereby small deviations from the model studied in the paper would not change the optimal contracts). More general dependences between private information and output and/or the cost of effort could be studied along the lines of Araujo and Moreira (2000) , although it does not seem like these technicalities would alter the main conclusions of the paper.
The model introduced in the paper, and in particular the results stated in section 3, can be generalized in several directions, since the potential set of actions a principal may take on an agency relationship is quite large. The next example extends the model in section 4 by allowing the risk of output to depend on the investment decision. It clearly illustrates how the standard positive relationship between incentives and risk can be reversed once the principal is active, in particular if the capital budgeting decision affects both the return and the risk of the projects under management.
Example 8. Consider the capital budgeting setting discussed in section 4 but allowing the risk of output to depend on the investment decision. To keep the discussion simple, assume that η(θ) = 1, γ(θ) = 0 and δ(θ) = δ 0 + δ θ θ, i.e. private information only affects the pure marginal value of investment. Furthermore, assume that µ = B (output is contractible with noise), and that σ = sI, for some s ∈ R + . The variable s measures the impact of the investment decision on the risk of the performance measure. Note that this is a very natural generalization, since it adds an element of risk/return trade-off to the investment decision. It is straightforward to solve for the optimal menu using similar techniques as in section 4 to obtain:
, where κ ≡ 1/(1 + Rs 2 ). Figure 3 plots bonus coefficient against σ, showing one of the more interesting features of this example:
the bonus coefficient can be positively related to the risk of the performance measure. This offers yet another theoretical explanation for the existence of a positive relationship between compensation and risk (see Prendergast (2002) and the reference cited there for alternative models that generate this type of result). It should noted that the results in section 4 can be easily generalized to obtain more general implications between risk and incentives in this type of capital budgeting model.
Conclusions
The paper has generalized the standard principal-agent model to consider the effects on the optimal contracts of potential actions by the principal that influence the agency relationship.
In particular the cases of assignment of a capital budget on top of the compensation scheme, and allocating a set of tasks among the agents have been studied in detail. It has been shown that the existence and nature of the private information plays a crucial role on the implications from models driven by private information considerations, and several standard features of the optimal contracts are altered once the principal can affect the agency relationship. In particular, the nature of the private information has been shown to generate very different optimal contracts in a capital budgeting context. Moreover, the standard underproduction result, when measured by the incentives received by the agent through the contracts, can disappear:
an active principal may give higher incentives to lower types, as long as she compensates higher types with her actions.
There are several natural extensions that deserve further study. On one hand the model has abstracted from the source of the private information that the agents possess. Although this may be natural in many settings, it would be interesting to analyze situations where the information was endogenous, i.e. it was the product of some costly actions taken by the agent (for some recent work in this direction see Crémer, Khalil, and Rochet (1998a) , Crémer, Khalil, and Rochet (1998b) , Szalay (2001) ). The issue of delegating some tasks, as capital budgets, to an agent, as well as analysis of hierarchies within a firm, also seems an interesting route to pursue. Finally, the paper has looked at several aspects of the agency relationship that the principal can influence, each in isolation. Analyzing the case where the principal could influence simultaneously several aspects, i.e. the set of projects to be studied by an agent as well as the capital budget assigned to its division, deserves further attention.
The second-order conditions are 2η 2 β − 1 − β 2 η 2 − 2Hβ 2 η η ≤ 0;
−(γ + ηI)(γ + ηI + 2H(γ + η I)) ≤ 0; −(2η 2 β−1−β 2 η 2 −2Hβ 2 η η)(γ+ηI)(γ+ηI+2H(γ +η I))−[2η(γ+Iη)(1−β)−Hδ −2Hβ(γ η+η (γ+2ηI))] 2 ≥ 0.
The first two equations are immediately satisfied for η small enough. The last equation becomes, for η ≈ 0, γ(γ +2Hγ ) ≥ Hδ , which yields the sufficient condition in the proposition.
In the case with γ(θ) = 0, equation (17) becomes after some algebra: The case η(θ) = 0 follows from solving equation (17), which immediately yields (19).
Proof of proposition 4.
Given a menu {α(θ), β(θ), I 1 (θ), . . . , I n (θ)}, the agents optimal effort choice is given by the solution to α + βe µ(θ) − 1 2 e C(θ)e − R 2 σ 2 β 2 such that e i = 0 for those i such that I i = 0, which can be expressed as e = β(θ)C I (θ) −1 µ(θ). Table 1 : The table presents several comparative statics with respect to the special cases discussed in Proposition 3, assuming that the functions η, γ and δ are linear in θ. The first row establishes whether the non-negativity constraint for β binds before the non-negativity constraint for I: θ x denotes the highest value of θ for which x(θ) = 0. The second and third row analyze the monotonicity of the functions β(θ) and I(θ). †: if δ > 0 then the answer is as stated. Otherwise I(θ) = 0 for all θ and θ I ≤ θ β trivially. Figure 3: The graph plots the optimal bonus coefficient against the volatility of the performance measure under the optimal investment schedule. The parameter values for this example are R = 100,θ = 0,θ = 1, s = 0.1, δ 0 = 1 and δ θ = 0.8.
